Designing Markets for CO2 Emissions and Other Pollutants

  • Johannes Heister
  • Peter Michaelis
Conference paper
Part of the A Publications of the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation book series (EGON-SOHMEN)


According to scientific evidence, the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere will lead to a warmer climate and a change in life conditions on the planet in the decades to come. The primary cause for this global problem is the use of fossil fuels as a source of energy, such as coal, mineral oil and natural gas, which contain large proportions of solid carbon. The burning of these fuels leads to the emission of their carbon contents in the form of carbon dioxide, which contributes to global warming via the greenhouse effect.


Abatement Cost Precautionary Principle Direct Regulation Marginal Abatement Cost Emission Permit 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Johannes Heister
  • Peter Michaelis

There are no affiliations available

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