Abstract
Regarding the economics of public finance and the “new institutional economy”, there is a close connection of ethical problems with the problem of institutions and, nowadays, with institutional choice (see: Arrow 1970, p. 79; Buchanan 1984; Brennan/Buchanan 1985, p. 47; Van-berg/Buchanan 1988). Institutions are characterized by a certain kind of rules directing individual choices in a normative way. The tax-taking and public goods producing state is a representative example for such an institution. It is only the individuals that have restricted influences on the tax dimension by political elections (on the tax rates and the supply of public goods), and, by definition, no influences on the supply of merit goods. The state is not only able to increase the supply of public good, but also to choose between two modes of financing it: by taxes or by budget deficit spending. However, these decisions are ambiguous.
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Priddat, B.P. (1992). Behind the Veil of Time Rules, Institutions, and Temporal Stability. In: Koslowski, P. (eds) Ethics in Economics, Business, and Economic Policy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77434-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77434-8_4
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