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An Institutional-Economic Analysis of the Louvre Accord

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Money, Trade, and Competition

Part of the book series: A Publication of the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation ((EGON-SOHMEN))

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Abstract

Egon Sohmen’s research in the field of international currency systems, i.e., his comparative studies of fixed and flexible exchange rates, constituted early contributions to the comparative analysis of institutions which he performed with great virtuosity. In line with the approach prevailing at that time, he concentrated upon the way in which different exchange rate systems functioned.

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Translated from the German by Michael Hudson, University of Leeds.

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Authors
  1. Rudolf Richter
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  2. Udo Schmidt-Mohr
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kiel Institute of World Economics, P.O.Box 4309, W-2300, Kiel 1, Germany

    Herbert Giersch (Past President) (Past President)

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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Richter, R., Schmidt-Mohr, U. (1992). An Institutional-Economic Analysis of the Louvre Accord. In: Giersch, H. (eds) Money, Trade, and Competition. A Publication of the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77267-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77267-2_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-77269-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-77267-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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