Abstract
According to the established interpretation of Arrow’s theorem, the collective choice is rational, if we give up one of Arrow’s axioms A1–A5. The rejection of axiom A1 implies the consideration of two alternatives, when no paradoxes of voting arise, the ordinal and the cardinal approaches are equivalent, and a majority rule is acceptable in every respect. Since the problem of aggregation of preferences becomes trivial, we do not analyse this case. We also retain the unanimity axiom A3 as quite evident. Therefore we shall reject alternately axiom A2 (universality), A4 (independence of irrelevant alternatives), and later A5 (prohibition of dictatorship).
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Tanguiane, A.S. (1991). Aggregation of Fixed Independent Preferences. In: Aggregation and Representation of Preferences. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-76518-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-76516-2
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