Abstract
It is well known that, as a result of the development of computability theory and computer science, certain higher processes usually called “intelligent” have been proved as algorithmic, contrary to previous assumptions, Thus the hypothesis arose that it was possible to find a new level of explanation which could be crucial for the study of mind. In the course of the short history of AI, the hypothesis became more explicit. More recently Allen Newell (1980) discussed it as the physical symbol system hypothesis, widely accepted both in (classical, not connectionistic) AI and in cognitive science.The level of explanation chosen as the crucial one was the symbol level.
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© 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Cordeschi, R. (1989). Philosophical assumptions in Artificial Intelligence: a tentative criticism of a criticism. In: Retti, J., Leidlmair, K. (eds) 5. Österreichische Artificial-Intelligence-Tagung. Informatik-Fachberichte, vol 208. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74688-8_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74688-8_44
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