Debt Contract under Imperfect Information: A Survey

  • Xavier Freixas
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)


The classical analysis in terms of supply and demand appear irrelevant when the problem at hand is related to lending, and to the credit market. The limits that are imposed to the level of a firm’s debt by its creditors, or the effect of a firm’s capital structure on its value are phenomena that would still remain unexplained had the supply-demand analysis been uniquely employed.


Cash Flow Credit Market Optimal Contract Contingent Contract Debt Contract 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Freixas
    • 1
  1. 1.Université de Toulouse I et GREMAQToulouse CédexFrance

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