Abstract
It is shown that the Nash bargaining problem can be solved as a hierarchical decision problem, where at the top level of the hierarchy a fixed point equation is solved to obtain the bargaining solution. As a practical application of the approach the computation of a cooperative energy management policy for a power pool consisting of N interconnected power systems is considered.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ehtamo, H., J. Ruusunen, and R. P. Hämäläinen (1987), “On the Computation of the Nash Bargaining Solution with an Energy Management Example,” Helsinki Univ. Tech., Syst. Anal. Lab., Rep. A20.
Nash, J. F. (1950), “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, Vol. 28, pp. 155–162.
Roth, A. E. (1979), “Axiomatic Models of Bargaining,” Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg.
Singh, M. G. (1980), “Dynamical Hierarchical Control,” North Holland, Amsterdam.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ehtamo, H., Ruusunen, J., Hämäläinen, R.P. (1988). The Formulation of the Nash Bargaining Problem as a Hierarchical Control Problem. In: Schellhaas, H., van Beek, P., Isermann, H., Schmidt, R., Zijlstra, M. (eds) DGOR/NSOR. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1987. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73778-7_140
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73778-7_140
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19365-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-73778-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive