A Global Competition Policy for a Global Economy

  • Dennis C. Mueller
Conference paper
Part of the Publications of the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation book series (EGON-SOHMEN)

Abstract

The growth of world trade since World War II and the decline in restrictions on international trade contained first in the GATT agreements, and now promulgated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), have produced what truly can be called “ a global economy.” The main targets of GATT and the WTO have been government restrictions on trade, however. As these have fallen and trade has expanded, the importance of private restrictions on trade has grown. What gain is there to a country that reduces a tariff on a product by 20%, if an export cartel promptly raises the price of the product by 20%?

Keywords

Europe Income Explosive Assure Expense 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis C. Mueller

There are no affiliations available

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