Dead Souls: Or Why the Neurobehavioral Science of Emotion Should Pay Attention to Cognitive Science

Abstract

The broad purpose of this chapter is to show how a reevaluation of our notions of cognitive processes can lead to a more useful definition of emotional states, and how this working definition may facilitate research in the behavioral and neurosciences. We take as a working axiom the supposition of psychologies of experience that states of emotion exist, representing organizations of memories, current behavioral dispositions, and anticipated outcomes. However, we will raise the question: Is human subjectivity a valid guide to this terrain? Our main purpose is to provide (a) the basis for an explanation of emotional phenomena which is predicated on events that can be observed and measured by the community of scientists and (b) a theory that has no other constraint than the usual scientific requirements of data accountability, parsimony, and a potential statement of quantitative relationships in the logic of mathematics.