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Scorekeeping in a Language Game

  • David Lewis
Part of the Springer Series in Language and Communication book series (SSLAN, volume 6)

Abstract

At any stage in a well-run conversation, a certain amount is presupposed. The parties to the conversation take it for granted; or at least they purport to, whether sincerely or just “for the sake of the argument”. Presuppositions can be created or destroyed in the course of a conversation. This change is rule-governed, at least up to a point. The presuppositions at time t′ depend, in a way about which at least some general principles can be laid down, on the presuppositions at an earlier time t and on the course of the conversation (and nearby events) between t and t′.

Keywords

Score Function Definite Description Language Game Constitutive Rule Home Team 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Lewis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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