Abstract
We have seen in Chapter II that one may define, in a natural way, general equilibria of the Cournot-Nash type, even when full allowance is made for the selling of commodities by monopolists to monopolists, and the direct flow of monopolists’ profits to shareholding consumers. We have developed proofs of existence of these equilibria under certain conditions on the economy. Several of these conditions, however, are very complex and very strong.
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© 1974 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Marschak, T., Selten, R. (1974). A New Approach to Monopolistic and Other Noncooperative Equilibria: The Theory of “Convolutions” (Rationality-Preserving Response Functions). In: General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 91. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-06624-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-65802-0
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