Abstract
In this chapter we study economies in which at least some firms are monopolists, and pursue to the most general possible case a general equilibrium in which the traditional Cournot-Nash property is displayed: a state in which markets are cleared and every monopolist has no wish to revise his decisions given that the others will stay with their decisions. We attempt to find weak conditions under which such equilibria can be shown to exist.
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© 1974 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Marschak, T., Selten, R. (1974). General Equilibrium with a Monopolistic Sector: Equilibria of Traditional Type. In: General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 91. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-65802-0_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-06624-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-65802-0
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