Game Theory Models of Fisheries Management — a Survey

  • Veijo Kaitala
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 265)


A survey of the literature dealing with the multi-agent exploitation of fishery resources is presented. The most common problems of fishery management include competitive exploitation of open-access fishery resources, non-cooperative and cooperative or bargaining approaches to resource management. This survey concentrates on papers which deal with dynamic game and control theory problems of resource modelling and bargaining.


Fishery Management Differential Game Fishing Effort Fishing Fleet Infinite Time Horizon 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Veijo Kaitala
    • 1
  1. 1.Systems Analysis LaboratoryHelsinki University of TechnologyEspooFinland

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