Abstract
A survey of the literature dealing with the multi-agent exploitation of fishery resources is presented. The most common problems of fishery management include competitive exploitation of open-access fishery resources, non-cooperative and cooperative or bargaining approaches to resource management. This survey concentrates on papers which deal with dynamic game and control theory problems of resource modelling and bargaining.
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Kaitala, V. (1986). Game Theory Models of Fisheries Management — a Survey. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_10
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