Abstract
A general formulation of dynamic and differential games is given, which includes both discrete and continuous time problems as well as deterministic and stochastic games. Solution concepts are introduced in two categories, depending on whether the dynamic game is defined in normal or extensive form. For the former, we present the Nash, Stackelberg and Consistent Conjectural Variations (CCV) equilibria, with considerable discussion devoted to the CCV solution, including comparisons with other more specific definitions found in the literature. For games in extensive form, we discuss the feedback solution concepts, and elaborate on the time consistency issue, which is currently of major interest in the economics literature. The chapter concludes with a discussion which puts into proper perspective the topics and contributions of the ten papers to follow, and their relationships with each other.
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Başar, T. (1986). A Tutorial on Dynamic and Differential Games. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_1
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