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Springers Handbuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre 1 pp 1–42Cite as

Mikroökonomik

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Zusammenfassung

Mikroökonomik wird gemeinhin als dasjenige Teilgebiet der Wirtschaftswissenschaften verstanden, in dem Entscheidungen und Verhalten einzelner Wirtschaftssubjekte und deren Interaktion untersucht werden. Jedes einführende Lehrbuch behandelt exemplarisch die Theorie des Konsumentenverhaltens (Haushaltstheorie) und die Theorie des Produzentenverhaltens (Produktionstheorie), sowie die Interaktion von Konsumenten und Produzenten in einer marktmäßigen Umgebung. Die Erklärungsziele der Mikroökonomik liegen letztlich — wie die der Makroökonomie — in Phänomenen auf sozialer (resp. aggregierter) Ebene; für den mikroökonomischen Ansatz werden Beziehungen zwischen Aggregaten aber erst dann gehaltvoll, wenn diese Aggregate als „Summe“ individuellen (Entscheidungs-) Verhaltens konsistent interpretiert werden können.

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Authors
  1. Wolfgang Leininger
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik Fakultät für VWL, Universität Mannheim, Seminargebäude A5, D-68131, Mannheim, Germany

    Jürgen von Hagen

  2. Fakultät für VWL, Universität Mannheim, Seminargebäude A5, D-68131, Mannheim, Germany

    Axel Börsch-Supan Ph. D. (Lehrstuhl für Makroökonomik und Wirtschaftspolitik) (Lehrstuhl für Makroökonomik und Wirtschaftspolitik)

  3. Wirtschafts- u. Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät Lehrstuhl Wirtschaftspolitik/Internat. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW), Universität Potsdam, August-Bebel-Straße 89, D-14482, Potsdam, Germany

    Paul J. J. Welfens

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Leininger, W. (1996). Mikroökonomik. In: von Hagen, J., Börsch-Supan, A., Welfens, P.J.J. (eds) Springers Handbuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61466-8_1

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