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Trade Wars and Trade Talks

  • Gene M. Grossman
  • Elhanan Helpman
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in International Economics and Institutions book series (INTERN.ECONOM.)

Abstract

When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.

Keywords

Trade Policy Foreign Government Campaign Contribution Export Subsidy Lobby Group 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gene M. Grossman
  • Elhanan Helpman

There are no affiliations available

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