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Multidimensional signalling and entry decision strategies

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Operations Research Proceedings 1996

Abstract

We define perfect Bayesian equilibria for a multiperiod multisignal game between a single incumbent firm and a potential entrant into a given market. We argue that searching for these equilibria is prevented by significant theoretical and computational issues. Then, we tackle the entry decision problem by an efficient sequential and incremental solution procedure that works on a Bayesian belief network and identifies a reasonable outcome of the game.

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Campisi, D., Nastasi, A., Reverberi, P. (1997). Multidimensional signalling and entry decision strategies. In: Operations Research Proceedings 1996. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1996. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60744-8_56

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60744-8_56

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-62630-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60744-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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