Abstract
We define perfect Bayesian equilibria for a multiperiod multisignal game between a single incumbent firm and a potential entrant into a given market. We argue that searching for these equilibria is prevented by significant theoretical and computational issues. Then, we tackle the entry decision problem by an efficient sequential and incremental solution procedure that works on a Bayesian belief network and identifies a reasonable outcome of the game.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Balachander, S. and Srinivasan, K. (1994), “Selection of product line qualities and prices to signal competitive advantage”, Management Science, vol. 40, n. 7, pp. 824–841.
Campisi, D., Nastasi, A., Reverberi, P. (1996) “Market entry decision strategies under incomplete information” in Management and New Technology, COST A3 International Conference Proceedings, Madrid, pp. 136–145.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991), Game theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1973), “Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 2, pp. 1–23.
Koller, D. and Megiddo, N. (1992), “The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 4, pp. 528–552.
Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R. (1982), “Sequential equilibria”, Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 863/894.
Milgtom, P. and Roberts, J. (1982), “Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: an equilibrium analysis”, Econometrica, vol. 50, n. 2, pp. 443–459.
Pearl, J. (1984), Heuristics: intelligent search strategies for computer problem-solving, Addison-Wesley.
Pearl, J. (1992), Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, California.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Campisi, D., Nastasi, A., Reverberi, P. (1997). Multidimensional signalling and entry decision strategies. In: Operations Research Proceedings 1996. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1996. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60744-8_56
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60744-8_56
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-62630-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60744-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive