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Old-Age Pension Systems: A Theoretical Evaluation

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Reforming the Welfare State

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, many countries have introduced public pension systems. Other countries, where such systems already existed, have expanded them considerably. The sheer size of these systems is startling. Germany, for example, spent over 300 billion marks on public pensions in 1992, that is, nearly 15% of its national income.1

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Authors
  1. Stefan Homburg
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Düsternbrooker Weg 120, D-24105, Kiel, Germany

    Herbert Giersch (Past President) (Past President)

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Homburg, S. (1997). Old-Age Pension Systems: A Theoretical Evaluation. In: Giersch, H. (eds) Reforming the Welfare State. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64431-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60497-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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