Sequencing and the Size of the Budget Experimental Evidence

  • Roy J. Gardner
  • Jürgen von Hagen


We present the results of an experiment designed to test the proposition that sequencing budget decisions has systematic influence on the size of the budget. The results suggest that individuals vote strategically, leading to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the underlying voting game. The evidence yields no support for the claim that top-down budgeting provides for more fiscal discipline than bottom-up budgeting.


Ideal Point Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Strategic Vote Vote Game Budget Process 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Congressional Budget Process-An Explanation. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1987.Google Scholar
  2. Crain, W. Mark, and James C. Miller III, “Budget Processes and Spending Growth”. William and Mary Law Review 31, 1993, 1021–46Google Scholar
  3. Davis, Douglas and Charles Holt, Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.Google Scholar
  4. Eckel, Catherine, and Charles Holt, “Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Experiments”. American Economic Review 79, 1989, 763–73.Google Scholar
  5. Ferejohn, John, and Keith Krehbiel, “The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget,” American Journal of Political Science. 31 (1987), 296–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. OECD, The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. Paris, 1987.Google Scholar
  7. Rubin, Irene. The Politics of Public Budgeting: Getting and Spending. Borrowing and Balancing. New York: Chatham House, 1993.Google Scholar
  8. Schick, Alan, “Macro-Budgetary Adaptations to Fiscal Stress in Industrialized Democracies”. Public Administration Review 46 (1986), 124–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Selten, Reinhard, “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfrageträgheit”. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 1965, 301–24Google Scholar
  10. Selten, Reinhard, “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfrageträgheit”. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 1965, 667–89Google Scholar
  11. Selten, Reinhard, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4, 1975, 25–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Selten, Reinhard, “Properties of a Measure of Predictive Success” Mathematical Social Sciences 21. 1991, 153–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. von Hagen, Jürgen, “Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the EC,” European Commission (DG II) Economic Papers 92, 1992.Google Scholar
  14. von Hagen, Jürgen and Ian Harden, “National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance,” European Economy Reports and Studies 3 (1994). 311–418.Google Scholar
  15. Wildavsky, Aaron, Budgeting. Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1975.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roy J. Gardner
    • 1
  • Jürgen von Hagen
    • 2
  1. 1.Departments of Economics and West European StudiesIndiana UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Mannheim, Indiana University School of Business, and CEPRUSA

Personalised recommendations