Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches pp 115–126Cite as

Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: NATO ASI Series ((NATO ASI F,volume 155))

Abstract

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Allen, Beth (1991) Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core. Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences Working Paper #91–38, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Also distributed as CORE Discussion Paper No. 9221, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Beth (1992) Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The value. Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences Working Paper #92–11, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Beth (1993) Supermechanisms. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Beth (1994) Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: Approximate NTU cores in large economies. In: Barnett, W.A., Moulin, H., Salles, M., Schofìeld, N.J. (eds.) Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics. Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Caen, 1992. International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Cambridge University Press, 263–276.

    Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont, Claude and Gérard-Varet, Louis-André (1979) Incentives and incomplete information. Journal of Public Economics 11, 25–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont, C. and Gérard-Varet, L.-A. (1982) Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 83–103.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Berliant, Marcus (1992) On income taxation and the core. Journal of Economic Theory 56, 121–141.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Blume, Lawrence and Easley, David (1990) Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory 51, 207–227.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd, John H. and Prescott, Edward C. (1986) Financial intermediary-coalitions. Journal of Economic Theory 38, 211–232.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Forges, Françoise M. (1986) An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1375–1385.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, Milton and Townsend, Robert M. (1981) Resource allocation under asymmetric information. Econometrica 49, 33–64.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, John C. (1967–68) Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. Management Science 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro and Idzik, Adam (1992) Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies. Mimeo, Department of Economics, Ohio State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, Matthew O. (1991) Bayesian implementation. Econometrica 59, 461–477.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Koutsougeris, Leonidas and Yannelis, Nicholas C. (1992) Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krasa, Stefan and Yannelis, Nicholas C. (1994) The value allocation of an economy with differential information. Econometrica 62, 881–900.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard, John O. (1986) The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 59–82.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Marimon, Ramon (1989) The core of private information economies. UAB/IAE Discussion Papers W.P. 131.90, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maskin, Eric (1977) Nash equilibria and welfare optimality. Mimeo, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matsushima, Hitoshi (1988) A new approach to the implementation problem. Journal of Economic Theory 45, 128–144.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Matsushima, Hitoshi (1991) Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability. Journal of Economic Theory 54, 198–205.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, Roger B. (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47, 61–74.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, Roger B. (1984) Cooperative games with imcomplete [sic] information. International Journal of Game Theory 13, 69–96.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, Roger B. (1986) Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54, 323–358.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, Roger B. (1991) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, Frank H. Jr. (1992) Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. Mimeo, Department of Finance, University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) Implementation and Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design. In: Laffont, Jean-Jacques (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory, Volume 1. Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Barcelona, 1990. Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press, 283–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1986) Private information in large economies. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 34–58.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) On Bayesian implementable allocations. Review of Economic Studies 54, 193–208.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) Implementation with incomplete information in exchange economies. Econometrica 57, 115–134.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1991), Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication. Journal of Economic Theory 55, 17–40.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1992) Bayesian Implementation. Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics, Harwood Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Postlewaite, Andrew and Schmeidler, David (1986) Implementation in differential information economies. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 14–33.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Postlewaite, Andre and Schmeidler, David (1987) Differential information and strategic behavior in economic environments: A general equilibrium approach. In: Groves, T., Radner, R., and Reiter, S. (eds.) Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz. University of Minnesota Press, 330–348.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenmüller, Joachim (1990) Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information. Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung Working Paper Nr. 190, Universität Bielefeld.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, Robert W. (1978) Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies 45, 595–604.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Savage, L.J. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, USA

    Beth Allen

  2. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 250 Marquette Avenue, Minneapolis, MN, 55480, USA

    Beth Allen

Authors
  1. Beth Allen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, 91904, Jerusalem, Israel

    Sergiu Hart

  2. Faculat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, c/ Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, E-08005, Barcelona, Spain

    Andreu Mas-Colell

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Allen, B. (1997). Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information. In: Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A. (eds) Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches. NATO ASI Series, vol 155. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64413-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60454-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation