Abstract
New models are introduced, used and they disappear. Many of them are launched as the final model that will overcome all obstacles with existing models. However, in a long-term perspective we can see that the models are not as good as promised and that they do not solve the problems or questions they were aimed to solve. This chapter aims to show how two theories, the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory can broaden the perspective on model building. As an introduction I give an overview of the two theories. Then I suggest some modifications and finally I stress the possible applications of these theories in Business Modelling.
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Rapp, B. (1999). Principal-Agent and Transaction Cost Theories in Business Modelling. In: Nilsson, A.G., Tolis, C., Nellborn, C. (eds) Perspectives on Business Modelling. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58458-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58458-9_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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