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Observable Instability for the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

  • Miranda Mowbray
Conference paper

Abstract

This paper shows how to construct mutant strategies for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with a large expected number of rounds in such a way that the introduction of these mutants at very low levels in the population changes the observable behaviour of the population playing the game. This gives a stronger instability result than ones previously proved in the literature. A similar result is also proved for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with a fixed number of rounds.

Keywords

Finite Time Pure Strategy Strategy Distribution Evolutionary Stability Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Miranda Mowbray
    • 1
  1. 1.Hewlett Packard LaboratoriesStoke GiffordUK

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