Observable Instability for the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This paper shows how to construct mutant strategies for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with a large expected number of rounds in such a way that the introduction of these mutants at very low levels in the population changes the observable behaviour of the population playing the game. This gives a stronger instability result than ones previously proved in the literature. A similar result is also proved for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with a fixed number of rounds.
KeywordsFinite Time Pure Strategy Strategy Distribution Evolutionary Stability Evolutionary Stable Strategy
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Axelrod R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- 2.Axelrod R., D’Ambrosio L. (1994) http://www.pscs.lsa.umich.edu/RE5EARCH/EvoL_of_Coop_Bibnography.html
- 5.Colman A.M. (1982) Game Theory and Experimental Games. Pergamon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar