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Existence of Cooperative Equilibria in Strategic Form Games

  • Hans Keiding
Conference paper

Abstract

In the present paper, we formulate and prove a general existence theorem for equilibria of games in strategic form. The existence theorem is then applied to strong Nash equilibria and to strong coalition proof Nash equilibria. The approach relies on a generalization to strategic form games of the balancedness conditions known from cooperative game theory.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Theory Coalitional Stability Balance Family Cooperative Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Keiding
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CopenhagenCopenhagen K.Denmark

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