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Coalitions in Multilateral Negotiations

Aspirations, Agreements, and Outcomes

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Surveys in Experimental Economics

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

Abstract

For most negotiations we can assume that participants or parties like to establish results more favourable than attainable without communication. In this survey it is assumed that all parties meet at one place to freely discuss how to establish cooperation by coalition formation and how to share the gains of cooperation. The formal analysis of the incentive structure of such settings is based on game theoretical methods including the field of cooperative game theory. Observations from a variety of experimental scenarios are compiled and evaluated. The experimental scenarios considered include characteristic function scenarios and matrix scenarios. For matrix scenarios we distinguish the binding agreement environment and the non-binding agreement environment.

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  1. Axel Ostmann
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  1. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Lehrstuhl VWL, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Große Scharrnstraße 59, Frankfurt/Oder, D-15230, Germany

    Friedel Bolle

  2. Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Managerial Economics, Technische Universität Dresden, Mommsenstraße 13, Dresden, D-01062

    Marco Lehmann-Waffenschmidt

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Ostmann, A. (2002). Coalitions in Multilateral Negotiations. In: Bolle, F., Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, M. (eds) Surveys in Experimental Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57458-0_3

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