Zusammenfassung
Unter welchen Bedingungen kann es den Anbietern in einem Markt gelingen, die gegenseitige Konkurrenz mittels Kartellen, Absprachen oder auch nur stillschweigender Kooperation wirksam zu begrenzen? Welche Effekte haben diese verschiedenen Formen der Kooperation auf das Marktergebnis? Wie stabil sind solche Kooperationen? Ist Kooperation generell schädlich, oder kann es aus wohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht unter Umständen vorteilhaft sein, wenn die Unternehmen bestimmte Tätigkeiten koordinieren? Präziser gefragt: Sind Joint Ventures zu verbieten? Wie verhält es sich mit gemeinsamen Investitionen in die Forschung und Entwicklung? Und welche Effekte haben Fusionen auf das Marktergebnis?
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Bühler, S., Jaeger, F. (2002). Kooperation und Kollusion. In: Einführung in die Industrieökonomik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56065-1_4
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