Abstract
Given the water scarcity in the Middle East, the Jordan River as well the West Bank Mountain Aquifer are prime examples of internationally shared water resources that hold the potential for conflict. The last century witnessed substantial tension among the co-riparian states and included skirmishes over water (Wolf/Ross 1992; Reguer 1993; Lowi 1995). Between 1950 and 1990, the U.S. government attempted to mediate a number of water disputes with limited success. By the early 1990’s, no water agreements existed between Israel and its neighbours, and the de facto water use regime was heavily disputed. During the course of the Middle East peace talks, several agreements were concluded which contain provisions on water, notably the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994 and the Interim (Oslo B) Agreement between Israelis and Palestinians of 1995. In addition, in 1996, a trilateral Declaration of Principles for cooperation on water-related matters was signed by Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.
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References
The author has first introduced this argument in Dombrowsky (2001, in German).
Unless indicated otherwise, water use quantities in this chapter are based on Dombrowsky (1998). According to Shuval and Feitelson (2002: 168), estimated per-capita consumption figures for the year 2000 were 270 m3/c/yr in Israel, 200 m3/c/yr in Jordan, and about 90 m3/c/yr for the Palestinians.
Kenley Brunsdale, Middle East Water and Energy Institute, presentation at the Middle East Institute/World Bank Sixth Annual Conference, Washington DC, May 15, 2001.
International water law has been late to be codified. In 1966, the International Law Association, a non-governmental professional association, adopted the Helsinki Rules. In May 1997, after more than 20 years of negotiations, the UN General Assembly adopted the ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Water Courses’. The Convention focuses on four principles, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation, the obligation not to cause significant harm, the general obligation to cooperate, and the obligation of prior notification. Until June 2000, the Convention had only been ratified by seven countries world-wide, including Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel abstained during the vote (Allan 2001: 302f).
Treaty of Peace Between The State of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994.
Article I.1 a. & b. of Annex II limit Israel’s extractions from the Yarmouk to 25 MCM/yr. This implies a reduction from an estimated extraction of c. 75 MCM/yr. Article I.l.c. however allows for the use of additional excess water downstream of point 121/Adassiya through both parties. According to Edig, Israel was able to catch such unused flows in the order of 45 MCM/yr, as long as the new diversion dam at Adassiya was not completed (Edig 2001: 145).
Haddadin (2000: 279) maintains that the Jordanians stressed during the negotiations “and the Israelis recognized that the outcome of their negotiations would not prejudice the rights of the other parties, especially the Palestinians”. This understanding, however, is not reflected in the treaty.
Interim Agreement Between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article 40, Water and Sewage, Washington DC, 28 September 1995.
Zafrir Rinat: “The wells are running dry in West Bank villages”, in: Ha’aretz, 23 May 2001, also at: <http://www.haaretz.co.iI/special/water-e/d/365019.asp/special/water-e/d/365019.asp>, 23 January 2002.
Ibd.
E.g. “Building a Palestinian state, in reverse”, in: The Economist, 19 January 2002: 37.
Ze’ev Schiff: “Israel-PA Cooperation in Water — the One Exception”, in: Haaretz, 13 February 2001, at: <http://www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/isreport/janfeb01/water.html>, 23 January 2002; Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee: “Joint Declaration for Keeping the Water Infrastructure out of the Cycle of Violence”, done at Erez Crossing, 31 January 2001, at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jcs0>, 23 January 2002.
Chuck Lawson, US State Department, in a conversion on May 15, 2001.
Declaration of Principles For Cooperation on Water-related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources. Joint Statement by the State of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Oslo, 12 June 1996 (production: CESAR, Oslo, Norway).
According to Zürn (1991: 213), linkage strategies are the classical solution to a Rambo game situation with asymmetric power and reversed interests.
This interpretation differs from Libiszweski’s (1995: 76) that: “the zero-sum game in sharing water was complemented by cooperative win-win strategies, making a compromise easier”.
A number of observers have been quite optimistic, e.g. Wolf (2000: 112) writes: “Before and during each set of concluded negotiations, both popular and academic commentary has appeared arguing that territory is critical for hydrostrategy, yet the actual solutions in each case have focused on creative joint management of the resource, rather than insistence on sovereignty.... This has been true of agreements completed as of this writing... where arrangements were made for joint management, in lieu of sovereignty.” Kliot (2000: 211) argues that in contrast to the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, the Israeli-Palestinian agreement is not only a water ‘allocation’ agreement, but may even ‘qualify’ as a ‘joint management’ agreement.
One may ask why the Palestinians agreed to the terms of the agreement. According to Rouyer (2000: 244), the Deputy Chairman of PWA, Fadil Qawash, stated in an interview that the PA “only signed the water accords of the Oslo II agreements because they needed water immediately not in five or ten years”.
In the case of the Indus River, the conflict was settled by choosing the economically sub-optimal strategy of ‘nationalisation’, rather than ‘internationalisation’, by granting Indian control over the eastern tributaries, and Pakistani control over the western (Bernauer 1997: 166). It is granted that this is more easily done with surface than with groundwater resources.
This distinction reflects two different normative regulative ideas in environmental policy: the idea of ‘optimal environmental protection’, anchored in neo-classic economic theory, and the idea of ‘the realisation of societal gains from co-operation’, based on game theory, constitutional economics and new institutional economics (Suchanek 2001).
The model, however, allows for the incorporation of subsidies for agriculture.
Trade could be carried out on the basis of the current property regime, with the respective distributive repercussions (Coase 1960). To facilitate implementation, there has been talk of an escrow fund to deal with the ‘water in dispute’, and to use the fund for infrastructure development. Still, this requires giving up of sovereignty over ‘water in dispute’.
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Dombrowsky, I. (2003). Water Accords in the Middle East Peace Process: Moving towards Cooperation?. In: Brauch, H.G., Liotta, P.H., Marquina, A., Rogers, P.F., Selim, M.ES. (eds) Security and Environment in the Mediterranean. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55854-2_46
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