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Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management pp 871–882Cite as

How Venture Capital Institutions Affect the Structure of Startups’ Board of Directors

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Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 281))

Abstract

Venture Capital institutions is different from the general investors, they provide enterprises with not only funds but also improvements on the aspect of corporate. This paper took 285 companies listed before December 31, 2011 as samples; mainly studies VCI affect the board independence and professional structure. Results showed that the VCs can significantly improve the professionalism and independence of the board of directors. Research provides new empirical evidence for the inner mechanism of the venture capital to improve startups performance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    External director in this paper refer to the directors who do not take position in the enterprise or the parent company.

  2. 2.

    This data is not included in Table 75.3, it comes from the original data of this paper.

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the National Natural Science Fund of China (71072066, 71302183) and the Distinguished Young Scholars Fund of Sichuan University (SKJC201007, 2013JCPT006, SKQY201225).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, 610064, People’s Republic of China

    Yingkai Tang, Maomin Wu & Qilin Cao

  2. International Business School, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 611130, People’s Republic of China

    Jing Zhou

Authors
  1. Yingkai Tang
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  2. Maomin Wu
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  3. Qilin Cao
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  4. Jing Zhou
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jing Zhou .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China

    Jiuping Xu

  2. Depart de Enge Mecânica e Industrial, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia - Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCT/UNL), Caparica, Portugal

    Virgílio António Cruz-Machado

  3. LeBow College of Business Department of Decision Sciences, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

    Benjamin Lev

  4. Institute of Operations Research, Karlsruhe Institute ofTechnology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany

    Stefan Nickel

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© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Tang, Y., Wu, M., Cao, Q., Zhou, J. (2014). How Venture Capital Institutions Affect the Structure of Startups’ Board of Directors. In: Xu, J., Cruz-Machado, V., Lev, B., Nickel, S. (eds) Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 281. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55122-2_75

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55122-2_75

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-55121-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-55122-2

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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