Interactions Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Three-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union

  • Tomasz Michalak
  • Jacob Engwerda
  • Joseph Plasmans
Part of the Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance book series (DMEF, volume 16)


In this paper we consider the effectiveness of various coordination arrangements between monetary and fiscal authorities within a monetary union if an economic shock has occurred. We address this problem using a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. Using this model we study various coordination arrangements between fiscal and monetary players, including partial fiscal cooperation between only a subgroup of countries, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered yet in the New-Keynesian literature. Using a simulation study we show that, in many cases and from the global point of view, partial fiscal cooperation between a subgroup of fiscal players is more efficient than non-coordination and that, in general, full cooperation without an appropriate transfer system is not a stable configuration. Furthermore, in case there is no full cooperation we show that the optimal configuration of the coordination structure depends on the type of shock that has occurred. We present a detailed analysis of the relationship between coordination structures and type of shock.


Monetary Policy Central Bank Fiscal Policy Monetary Union Coalition Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Tomasz Michalak was supported by the European Research Council, AG291528 (“RACE”) and FSF project 2003–2006.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tomasz Michalak
    • 1
  • Jacob Engwerda
    • 2
  • Joseph Plasmans
    • 3
  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.Tilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  3. 3.University of AntwerpAntwerpBelgium

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