Abstract
The instruments for understanding classic international law are insufficient for handling the proliferation of logic among different sectors, which exhibit varying levels of internationalization and integration and operate according to different logics. Other instruments for coexistence must be found to enable the continuity and evolution of parallel systems for international coordination and cooperation, each with its own logic. Such systems intersect and thus require common solutions.
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Notes
- 1.
International Law Commission, United Nations, Conclusions of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law. 2006. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/projet_d%27articles/1_9_2006_francais.pdf. Accessed April 7, 2012.
- 2.
See, in particular, the general course of the Academy of International Law, by Dupuy (2002), pp. 9–489.
- 3.
Delmas-Marty, M. Her position can be deduced from the different works cited.
- 4.
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2003–2004), pp. 1045–1046.
- 5.
Delmas-Marty (2005), p. 28.
- 6.
Delmas-Marty (2003), p. 7. Most important, in Teubner’s reflexive law: norms, the result of interactions among social systems. Moving from Kelsen’s paradigm to Teubner’s, the law ceases to be an end so as to be a means and is not preexisting but is to be found in social relations and follows their dynamic. This instrumental view of the law is applied in different fields of law. It is a way to interpret the law that, at the same time, characterizes it. One example would be how an economic analysis of law perceives it. That example is also criticized as reductionist. What theories would not be subject to such criticism if they are, by definition, a reduction of a more complex reality that remains useful for studying it? Nonetheless, it is interesting to perceive that overcoming the paradigm of state law follows the adoption of an instrumental vision of the law, though it does not exclude it as an end, in terms of the object of research.
- 7.
Jouannet (2003), pp. 6–7.
- 8.
Jouannet (2011), p. 16 and ff. The author criticizes the perspective according to which the Peace of Westphalia is a framework for international law. Indeed, as different recent studies show, the peace of Westphalia is not a framework that determined the creation of modern international law. It was a treaty that celebrated a religious peace, on October 24, 1648, between Ferdinand III of France and the German princes, Sweden, and their allies. It is a religious peace (pax christiana) placing limits between politics and religion, but it did not change mindsets or the view of international law or of the states and was hardly used in the following century. The idea of an international legal order was likely born with Wolff and mainly with his disciple, Vattel, a century later. In light of the success of his work, he truly influenced outlooks and shaped the behaviors of European regents, diplomats, and public officials.
- 9.
Jouannet (2003), pp. 6–7.
- 10.
“Public international law proposes to make a transition between two contrary actions in fact, that of the principle of the autonomy of the states and that of the notion of a cosmopolitan society.” Bonfils (1905).
- 11.
- 12.
Fiore (1911), p. 105.
- 13.
Bluntschli (1870), p. 53.
- 14.
Jouannet (2003), p. 11.
- 15.
Scelle (1927), p. 358 and ff.
- 16.
Jouannet (2003).
- 17.
Kelsen (2013), p. 37.
- 18.
Ost and van de Kerchove (2002), pp. 3–4.
- 19.
- 20.
The definitions are by Dupuy (2006).
- 21.
Kelsen (2013), p. 63.
- 22.
See the works by Kelsen that specifically address the issue and are used in different parts of this text such as “Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public,” Principles of International Law, Peace through Law, among others.
- 23.
Moser (1666) cited by Verdross (1927), p. 259.
- 24.
- 25.
Jouannet (2011), pp. 29–32.
- 26.
Kelsen (2013), p. 88.
- 27.
ICJ. Dispute between Belgium and Senegal, on issues related to the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Decision of May 28, 2009.
- 28.
Jouannet (2003), p. 4.
- 29.
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the phenomenon based on the analysis of the relationships between the norms themselves and the mechanisms for dispute settlement and validation. Here, the idea is to weave together comments based on the reading that starts from a generic perspective of the specific elements.
- 30.
Dupuy (2006), p. 2.
- 31.
Teubner (2012), p. 81.
- 32.
Dupuy (2006), p. 9.
- 33.
Burke-White (2004), p. 963 and ff.
- 34.
Barzotto (2007), pp. 240–241.
- 35.
Dupuy (2006), pp. 8–9.
- 36.
Dupuy (2006), pp. 9 and 11.
- 37.
Hart in Hart (1983), pp. 343–364. Hart criticizes Kelsen’s concept of legal system, especially regarding the formal validation of norms and on not allowing for or ignoring a plurality of legal systems. See also Hart in Hart (1983), pp. 286–309, in which the author describes the debate he had with Kelsen at Berkeley on the monist conception of the legal system based on the rule of formal validation.
- 38.
Rigaux (1985), p. 270.
- 39.
Carbonnier (1972), p. 205.
- 40.
Oellers-Frahm (2001), p. 73.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
Kelsen (1926), p. 18.
- 44.
Delmas-Marty (2005), p. 209.
- 45.
Delmas-Marty (2003), p. 235.
- 46.
Varella (2003), pp. 331–376.
- 47.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 4.
- 48.
Discussion with Teubner, in videoconference with the doctoral students in law at the Centro Universitário de Brasília, on June 23, 2010.
- 49.
On this topic, see the interesting work by Lambert-Adelgawad and Martin-Chenut (2008), p. 101 and ff.
- 50.
Jouannet (2005).
- 51.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), pp. 84–85.
- 52.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), pp. 84–85.
- 53.
Jouannet (2005), p. 18.
- 54.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 10.
- 55.
Amselek (1978), p. 13.
- 56.
- 57.
Teubner (2009), p. 317. The problem is aggravated, in particular, in the distance between the traditional legal logic of private law and the reality of a law constructed in networks. Private law exhausts its capacity for regulation in the logic of bilateral contracts. Even though major gains have been made regarding civil liability in consumer law, in some states, such as Brazil, or in the case of objective liability for environmental harm, such as those resulting from the transport of hydrocarbons, internationally, the law is still far from recognizing a logic of common liability in contractual networks. One would need to have “different legal rules for multilateral contracts with regard to their formation, their validity, their defaults, and their termination. In addition, it will facilitate quasi-corporate governance structures in multilateral contracts identifying the legal conditions under which contractual networks will have to be treated as collective actors. Finally, it will increase individual and collective liability for faulty coordination vis-à-vis suppliers and buyers.” In these network relationships, unlike traditional private law, there may be collective interests, of the network, such as the legitimacy of the productive chain.
- 58.
Teubner (2009), p. 127.
- 59.
Febbrajo (1992), pp. 20–32. The author uses these analytical categories for autopoietic systems. It is an adaptation of the theory to the logic of this work and not a description thereof as presented in the original.
- 60.
Cf. Febrajjo (1992), pp. 20–32.
- 61.
Delmas-Marty (2007), pp. 127–128.
- 62.
Faria (2004), pp. 179–180.
- 63.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 66.
- 64.
Bhadi (2002), pp. 42 and 53. The author makes an analysis of different decisions from the Commonwealth in which domestic judges used international precedents or provisions. The paper classified them in five categories: concerns with constructing a state under the rule of law, desire to promote universal values, grounding in international law as a way to cover up values inherent to a domestic legal system, willingness to invoke the logic of judges from another jurisdiction, and concern to avoid negative evaluations by the international community.
- 65.
The latter is especially present in some schools and in the authors of the Max Planck Institute of Heidelberg or of Peter Haberle (albeit without a view in his time of the important role of judges) or also, in Brazil, in the interviewing work by Neves.
- 66.
- 67.
Slaughter (1995), pp. 502–538, especially pp. 519–520.
- 68.
Teubner proposes having judges at the center of the international legal system. Discussion with Teubner, by exchange of emails, on March 30, 2012.
- 69.
- 70.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 91.
- 71.
The idea of otherness is one of the bases of discourse in moral theory and may be found in different premodern authors, for example St. Thomas of Aquinas. See Barzotto (2009), pp. 151–157.
- 72.
Toufayan (2010), p. 320.
- 73.
- 74.
Discussion with Teubner, in a videoconference for students in the doctorate in law at the Centro Universitário de Brasília, June 23, 2010.
- 75.
Teubner (1997), p. 11.
- 76.
Saleilles (1903), p. 181.
- 77.
Delmas-Marty (2010), p. 13.
- 78.
Cassese (2005), p. 988.
- 79.
Teubner (1997), p. 16.
- 80.
Marcelo Neves puts forth the idea of an international scenario with organizations in permanent conflict and competition, impeding the establishment of an international state, in Neves (2009), p. 88.
- 81.
Teubner (1997), pp. 2–4. According to the author, one need not talk about obstacles to the process of globalization of the law because the law is already globalized (videoconference, in 2011).
- 82.
Teubner (1997), p. 784.
- 83.
Hegel (1997), p. 173 and ff.
- 84.
Jouannet (2011), p. 126.
- 85.
In Kelsen’s words, “This is, to the contrary, precisely one of the core functions of the idea of a law equally superior to all states—an idea that presupposes the primacy of international law—to show that the territory of different states is delimited by law, such that violent intrusions and invasions and expansion, the essence of imperialism, appear contrary to law. The legal unity of humankind, whose more or less arbitrary division into states is just temporary, the organization of the world in a civitas maxima, that is the political core of the hypothesis of the primacy of international law; but at the same time it is the fundamental idea of pacifism, the antithesis of imperialism in international politics. Just as in an objectivist morality reflecting on man is reflecting on humankind, for objectivist legal theory, the notion of law is identical to that of international law, and it is at the same time and for this very reason a moral notion.” Kelsen (2013)
- 86.
In Kelsen’s words, “Hegel’s philosophy of the State, in particular—a philosophy with advocates in all nations—clearly expresses these connections. Hegel, in his philosophy of right, expressly qualifies international law as an external state law, and even remains faithful to the dogma on sovereignty of the State, which he admits without reservation, when he shows that the reason of the world (Weltgeist) was never chosen to regulate more than one single nation at a time. This is not a mere coincidence if his disciples professed that no doubt the legal power of the State extends, first and foremost, to the territory inhabited by its people, yet that territory does not constitute an absolute limit for the action of the State. It would be in the nature of the State to seek to extend its power to the territories susceptible to it, thanks to their natural qualities, complementary to the insufficiencies of the national territory. This is a form of imperialism. If imperialism is presented as the twin brother of the primacy of national/domestic law, and even more commonly as the negation of international law, it must nonetheless always bear in mind the relative nature of the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism. Hegel and his disciples, imperialists of all nationalities, are unquestionably the representatives of an objectivist or universalist metaphysics. Nonetheless, that universalism stops at the State. The way they construct the relations of the State (conceived of as an individual) and of humankind is radically individualist. One can further accentuate the individualism of the State with that Hegelian idea that there is a chosen nation or a chosen State. The only possible outcome is an unbound imperialism. And that explains why the theorists conceive of the relations of the State and its subjects in an absolutely universalist manner, and in so doing accept the objective validity of the legal order, are nonetheless radically imperialist when, in the international sphere, they think like individualists. In this domain, imperialism corresponds precisely to anarchy reigning in the national domain”, Kelsen (2013), p. 93.
- 87.
Jouannet (2011), p. 82.
- 88.
Teubner (1997), pp. 14–15.
- 89.
von Bogdandy (2012).
- 90.
Teubner (1997), p. 2.
- 91.
Delmas-Marty (2005), pp. 26–27.
- 92.
Delmas-Marty (2000), p. 753.
- 93.
Delmas-Marty (2007), p. 6.
- 94.
Delmas-Marty and Izorche (2000), p. 755.
- 95.
Rawls (1995), p. 63 and Delmas-Marty, various works. In the words of Delmas-Marty, “In sum, if legal pluralism contributes to social pluralism, then it is still in search of itself. Between a pluralism of juxtaposition, made up of normative systems that compete with one another and that are not hierarchically organized in relation to one another, and the utopian monism of strictly hierarchical and unified systems, there is no doubt room to construct, based on harmonized systems by means of a more supple dynamic of entangled hierarchically organized margins, a veritable ordered pluralism.” Delmas-Marty and Izorche (2000), p. 780.
- 96.
Teubner (1997), p. 5.
- 97.
See, in particular, Dupuy (2002).
- 98.
Segura-Serrano (2009), p. 20.
- 99.
Teubner (2012), p. 46.
- 100.
- 101.
Teubner (1997), pp. 765–766.
- 102.
Teubner (2012), p. 7.
- 103.
In particular, see the interesting work by Neves (2009), p. 91 and ff.
- 104.
Vattel (1758), book I, ch. III, p. 116, § 27, “This constitution, when it comes down to it, is nothing other than the establishment of order in which a Nation proposes to work together to obtain benefits in view of which political society has been established.”
- 105.
Peters (2006), p. 581.
- 106.
The cites are from Neves (2009), pp. 95–97.
- 107.
Teubner (2012), p. 2.
- 108.
Teubner (2012), pp. 1–2.
- 109.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 17.
- 110.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 26.
- 111.
- 112.
Koskenniemi (2007), p. 23. The author’s views differ on several points from those presented by Neves and Teubner, and there are interesting criticisms among them. In any event, there is a certain convergence in relation to the identification of languages, decentralized, that allows for systems of coordination disconnected from the national territories. The consolidation of those “functionally autonomous regimes would contribute to consolidating a constitutionalization of world law.”
- 113.
Neves (2009), pp. 120–121.
- 114.
Neves (2009), p. 125.
- 115.
Neves (2009), p. 80.
- 116.
Ost and Kerchove (2002), p. 16.
- 117.
Koskenniemi (2007), pp. 29 and 35. Along the same lines, see Nedelski (2000), pp. 1–39 and Koskenniemi (2005), p. 226 and ff. Teubner puts the question well, indicating the two extremes of the consideration of the constitutional norm in a system: Kelsen, associating constitution with a legal phenomenon, and Schmitt, associating the term with a social phenomenon, are not adapted to the understanding of the legal system. It is necessary to take both phenomena into account. See Teubner (2012), pp. 106–107.
- 118.
Slaughter (2004), p. 134.
- 119.
The very concept of peace is subjective. The Hitlerian pax would not be accepted, for example, as international peace in light of European concepts of equality and human rights. See the discussion in Koskenniemi (2005), p. 497.
- 120.
See, in particular, UNSC, Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (2012).
- 121.
- 122.
Teubner (2012), p. 105.
- 123.
Teubner (2012), p. 106.
- 124.
- 125.
Krisch (2010), pp. 52–53.
- 126.
See the reference work by Koskenniemi (2005).
- 127.
Even the first authors on contracts, such as Locke and Hobbes, with quite different theories, approached states from the idea of a society of individuals, based on equality, liberty, and interdependence, but did not believe in preexisting moral values. See the analysis by Koskenniemi (2005), pp. 90–91. The internationalization of legal thought, however, is less contested.
- 128.
- 129.
Salleiles cited by Delmas-Marty (2003), p. 35.
- 130.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 480.
- 131.
Mancini (2003), pp. 87–111 and 175–226.
- 132.
Cassese (2005), p. 980.
- 133.
- 134.
Derrida (1989–1990), pp. 111–124.
- 135.
Teubner (1997), pp. 775–776.
- 136.
Benjamin (2012), p. 237.
- 137.
- 138.
Twining (2010), pp. 473 and 478.
- 139.
Krisch (2010), p. 12.
- 140.
- 141.
Delmas-Marty (2003), pp. 220–223.
- 142.
Delmas-Marty (2010), p. 9.
- 143.
- 144.
Discussion with Teubner, June 23, 2010.
- 145.
Neves (2009), pp. 227–228.
- 146.
- 147.
Discussion with Teubner in the Program for Master’s and Doctorate in Law of UniCEUB, in 2010.
- 148.
Koskenniemi (2007), p. 18.
- 149.
Delmas-Marty (2005), p. 101.
- 150.
One example would be the EU’s convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, established as a tool for fighting transnational crime, which seeks to coordinate national judicial organs to achieve greater efficiency. Delmas-Marty (2005), p. 117.
- 151.
- 152.
Delmas-Marty (2007), p. 69.
- 153.
Neves (2009), p. 92.
- 154.
Benvenisti and Downs (2007), p. 595 and ff.
- 155.
Delmas-Marty (2007), p. 189.
- 156.
The arguments are Cheng’s, in the debate at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, in March 2012.
- 157.
Krish (2012).
- 158.
Bogdandy (2012).
- 159.
- 160.
Rosenfeld considers that Habermas developed Rawls’s ideas, for he refines the idea of the veil of ignorance, one of the cornerstones of Rawls’s theory of justice. Habermas goes further, for he allows the parties to put forth their differences at the outset, negotiating how the law could be construed so as to offset differences. He takes into account the importance of each identity and the difference of each of the perspectives represented in communicative action. The critique of the previous paradigm would be that it reduces justice to equal distribution of law, ignoring de facto equality. In the paradigm of the social welfare state, an attempt is made to focus on de facto inequality, reducing justice to distributive justice. Here, autonomy and dignity lost out. See Rosenfeld (1998), pp. 95–97.
- 161.
The concept is used in the national ambit by Rosanvallon.
- 162.
Unger (2012).
- 163.
Benvenisti and Downs (2007), pp. 598–600.
- 164.
Nedelski (2000), p. 12.
- 165.
Teubner (1997), pp. 9–11.
- 166.
- 167.
Speech at the OECD Forum, May 15, 2002.
- 168.
Delmas-Marty (2007), pp. 119, 124, 127, 257.
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Varella, M.D. (2014). The Problems of New and Old Concepts of International Law. In: Internationalization of Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54163-6_7
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