Abstract
As demonstrated in chapter 2, the use of production means in the armed forces, implies a withdrawal from such means from civil society. In civil society these means are relatively scarce with regard to occurring needs. Therefore, it can be said that means of production in the armed forces are also scarce. The output of the armed forces may be provided outside a market regime, however in regards to their inputs they are actually taking part in a civilian exchange process. Both on the labour market and on the capital market the armed forces have to satisfy the market demands.
“The larger point is that force structure itself should be a function of the costs of the specific inputs.”
Richard V.L. Cooper in: Military manpower and the All-Volunteer-Force, Santa Monica 1977, pp. 275.
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Literatur
In other words, because of the conscription tax the social cost of conscripts is far above the real cost.
For a general theoretical background see: A. Koutsoyiannis, Modern Microeconomics, London 1975.
See chapter 6, paragraph 1.
Research by AVNM: Verveling in dienst, Utrecht 1989
For 33.570 approved boys, you need 45.987 tested boys, because only 73% gets through. The wage that is needed to get the last well-tested boy in to the armed forces is / 17.684 net a year. For calculations see appendix 5.1.
See for calculation: Appendix 5.1.
Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, Santa Monica, 1977, pp. 286.
This paragraph is based on: M. Binkin, The Military Pay Muddle, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1975;
M. Binkin, H. Kanter and R.H. Clark, Shaping the defense civilian work force, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1978, and
Stichting Maatschappij and Krijgsmacht, The price of defense, The Hague, 1983.
See parliamentary question nr 207 and 211, Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 1990–1991,2199IX, nr. 8. The amount of combat positions for the Navy and the Air Force are estimated on the basis of the Defensienota 1991. The amount of marines is put at 3.000 and for the personnel on the ships (including relief) a ship-shore ratio of 3:7 counts. This ratio is well known in the United States. All other figures are based on the Defensienota 1991. The background of the number in training of 1.500 is given in paragraph 5.6.
The amount of military should be diminished to 86.696 in 1995 on a total of 107.573. Source Defensienota 1991. Because of the Prioriteitennota 1993 these figures are out of date now, but this is not relevant for a analysis of conscription.
See chapter 2, paragraph 2.
See for extension of this problem: chapter 7.
Charles Moskos, L’armee de metier Americaine (1973–1990): Constat de carence; Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale, Paris, February 1991.
Gay, Robert M., Estimating the cost of on-the-job training in military occupation: A methodology and pilot study, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 1974.
Committee Mommersteeg, Verplicht of vrijwillig dienen, Den Haag 1976.
Zie footnote 14.
See table 5.2. In 1992 the Netherlands had 51,.651 professionals
In 1992 the armed forces needed 4,550 professional military each year to fill their positions on 51 ,.000 positions totally. This means that in an armed forces with 35.,00 professional military positions, about 3.000 positions have to filled each year.
Civilians 37,000 x 65,848 = 2,436 million guilders, military: 35,000 x 70,461 = 2,466 million guilders.
Civilians: 37,000 x 65,848 = 2,436 million guilders, military: 35,000 x 74,797 = 2,617 million guilders.
Military: 99,000 x 68,730 = 6,804 million guilders + civilians 25,800 x 65,848 = 1,698 million guilders.
Military: 45,00 x 74,797 = 3,336 million guilders + civilians 48,000 x 65,848 = 3,161 million guilders.
(99,000 – 45,000)799,000 = 0.55
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Duindam, S. (1999). Conscription and the allocation of production factors. In: Military Conscription. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50005-3_5
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