Abstract
The aim of this book has been to report on some contributions to non-cooperative planning theory. Planning, in our terminology, is concerned with the design of communication and decision making mechanisms to cope with the decentralization of information and choice in organizations. Non-cooperative planning theory treats the incentive aspects hereof. Agents in an organization may be opportunistic. Hence, it is relevant to consider how communication and decision making procedures will work in strategic environments, and it is important to design enforcement mechanisms such that desired outcomes are sustained by non-cooperative behavior.
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Working Papers
Bogetoft, P., Strategic Behavior and the Organization of Multiple Person Decision Making, DASY, pp.1–36, 1989wp.
Bogetoft, P., The Role of Sufficient Statistics in Optimal Contracts, DASY, pp.1–29, 1990wp-a.
Bogetoft, P., Preference Investigations and Communication Activities in Negotiation Support Systems, DASY, pp.1–57, 1990wp-b.
Bogetoft, P., The Use of Non-Verifiable Information in Contracting, DASY, pp.1–40, 1990wp-c.
Bogetoft, P., Ancillary Information in Optimal Contracts, DASY, pp.1–21, 1990wp-d.
Bogetoft, P., Towards a “Blackwell’s Theorem” for Agency Problems, DASY, pp.1–19, 1990wp-e.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bogetoft, P. (1994). Summary and Conclusions. In: Non-Cooperative Planning Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 418. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48636-4_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58361-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48636-4
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