Abstract
This chapter extends the analysis of democratic dynamics to a consideration of the multiple group case. In the previous chapter, the basic conditions associated with the maintenance of a two party democracy were examined. This description is now expanded to an analysis of the interactions among multiple political actors. An important issue arises in the multiple party setting. In the -N- group setting, interests are represented directly. The interest aggregation process typical of the two party case is not present. Any group or interest in the multiple case can have a direct political significance. This means the previous emphasis upon the stabilizing effect of partisan interaction has to be reexamined. This is due to the more diversified character of the group interaction process. Multiple group interactions cannot only be mutually inhibitory, as in the two party case, but also mutually accommodative, as well as neutral. The important theoretical issue is whether a collective harmony among the groups emerges as a function of the overall interaction processes among the participants. This is an important issue for democratic theory. If such a harmony among interests does occur, then democratic political practice can operate with little to no need for externally imposed controls.
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Notes
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1954) 7. The reference to the “invisible hand” is made by Bernard Mandelville (1714) in The Fable of the Bees. See
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Robert Nozick sets out sixteen varieties of invisible hand explanations. These range from Von Mises’ account of how economic calculation is accomplished in markets to F.A. Hayek’s explanation of how social cooperation uses more knowledge than any individual possesses. Refer to Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 20–21.
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This idea of stability is given in Dragoslav D. Siljak, Large Scale Dynamical systems: Stability and Structure (New York: North Holland, 1978) 10–12. The issues associated with the stability of large scale dynamical systems are developed with great thoroughness in
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This result parallels, at the level of the dynamical system, Arrow’s theorem demonstrating the impossibility of a democratic social welfare function. This theorem shows in the case of individual preference, it is not possible to aggregate such preferences using a function embodying a set of mild constraints. Refer to, Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Value (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963).
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Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 291.
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Collins, W. (1989). -N- Party Democracy: The Role of the Minimal State. In: An Ecological Theory of Democracy. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48409-4_5
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