Abstract
Social dilemmata are characterized by the fact that decision makers maximizing individual payoff will receive more for themselves, but will reduce the common outcome. Typical examples for these conflicts are fishing quotes in the North Atlantic, pollution restrictions, family size limits, etc. The maximation principle of the normative utility model is not conclusive. Therefore, we constructed a multiattribute utility function with two weighted components for egoism and altruism describing and explaining the behavior in social dilemma games, especially for the union and commons dilemma. In a series of experimental studies the multiattribute utility maximation model was tested and the degree of context influences was examined. A comparison of different individualistic strategies for decision making will be discussed.
This research project was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arnarzus, H. (1974): Spieltheorie und Nutzenbegriff aus marxistischer Sicht. Frankfurt, M.
Dawes, R.M. (1975): Formal models of dilemmas in social decision making, in: M. Kaplan/S. Schwartz (eds.): Human judgment and decision processes, New York.
Fishbein, M./Ajzen, J. (1975): Belief, attitude, intention and behavior. Reading Massachusetts.
Griesinger, D.W./ Livingston, J.W. (1973): Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games, Behavioral Science, 18, pp. 173–188.
Groggel, R./Ksiensik, M.I./Wendt, D. (1986): Egoismus und Altruismus in sozialen Dilemmata- Forschungsbericht über das DFG Projekt WE 13/7–3, Institut für Psychologie der Universität Kiel, in Vorbereitung.
Hardin, G. (1968): The tragedy of the commons, Science, 162, pp. 1243–1248.
Messick, D.M. (1973): To join or not to join: An approach to the unionization decision, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 10, pp. 145–156.
Messick, D.M./McClintock, C.G. (1968): Motivational bases of choice in experimental games, Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 4, pp. 1–25.
Sawyer, J. (1966): The altruism scale: A measurement of co-operative, individualistic, and competitive interpersonal orientation, American Journal of Sociology, 71, pp. 407–416.
Wendt, D./Popp, M./Wettengel, A./Ksiensik, M.I. (1966): Egotism and altruism in social dilemmata, in: A. Upmeyer (ed.): Attitude and Behavioral Decisions (in press), New York.
Wiesner, J.B./York, H.F. (1964): National security and the nuclear test-ban, Scientific American, 211, pp. 27–35.
Wyer, R.S., Jr. (1969): Prediction of behavior in two-person games, Journal of Personality and Social Pychology, 13, pp. 222–238.
Wyer, R.S., Jr. (1971): Effects of outcome matrix and partner’s behavior in two-person games, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, pp. 190–210.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ksiensik, M.I., Wendt, D. (1988). Normative and Individual Strategies in Social Dilemmata. In: Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R. (eds) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 314. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50036-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48356-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive