Abstract
Cooperative game theory is dealing with set functions that are essentially non-additive. A game (with side payments) is regarded as a tripel \(\Lambda = \left( {\Omega ,\underline{\underline B} ,v} \right)\) where Ω is a set (“the players”) \({\underline{\underline B} }\) a system of subsets off) (“the admissible coalitions”) and \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} {v:\underline{\underline B} \to \mathbb{R}^ + ,} {v\left( \varphi \right) = 0} \\ \end{array}\), is a mapping. (v(S) is a “utility” or “monetary value” that coalition S € \(S \in \underline{\underline B}\) can achieve by cooperation), ∧ is said to be “superadditive”, “convex”,... etc., if ∨ is a superadditive, convex,... etc. set function.
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© 1977 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Rosenmüller, J. (1977). Preliminaries. In: Extreme Games and Their Solutions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 145. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48300-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48300-4_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-08244-6
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