Abstract
In Section 1 of this chapter, we start with analyzing observed average behavior. We distinguish, however, between subjects in the role of the low cost firm and subjects in the role of the high cost firm. Furthermore, we distinguish between first and second plays. In Section 2, we look at what happened, in the second plays, on the individual markets. We concentrate on the second plays because the subjects were, by then, more familiar with the game than in the first plays.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Keser, C. (1992). Results of the Game-Playing Experiments. In: Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 391. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-56090-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48144-4
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