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Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good: a Mechanism Design Problem under Uncertainty

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Firms, Markets, and Contracts

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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Abstract

A simple mechanism is designed to implement the efficient allocation of an indivisible good under uncertainty where no money transfers are to take place in equilibrium. The desired outcome is shown to be the only trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.

I am grateful to Erwin Amann, Matt Jackson, Wolfgang Leininger, Albert Ma and especially Rabah Amir for conversations and comments. Comments by two anonymous referees are also thankfully acknowledged.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Boston University, USA

    Chun-Lei Yang

Authors
  1. Chun-Lei Yang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Organisation, Universität München, Ludwigstraße 28, D-80539, München, Germany

    Arnold Picot

  2. Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität München, Schackstraße 4, D-80539, München, Germany

    Ekkehart Schlicht

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© 1997 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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Yang, CL. (1997). Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good: a Mechanism Design Problem under Uncertainty. In: Picot, A., Schlicht, E. (eds) Firms, Markets, and Contracts. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_15

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0947-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-46988-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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