Abstract
The first group of theorems of this chapter will allow us to show that no game value exists in the regions H n of Figure 1 if S I and S II have equal left endpoints and none exist in regions LA n if they have equal right endpoints. In particular, from Theorems 3.1, 3.4 and 3.10 it follows that there are no optimal strategies in the symmetric game on open intervals when (2.0.1) fails. Under conditions where optional strategies do exist, we shall usually find them among the key mixed strategies introduced in Chapter 2.
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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Heuer, G.A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. (1995). Intervals with Equal Left Endpoints or Equal Right Endpoints. In: Silverman’s Game. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 424. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46819-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46819-3_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-59232-7
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