Editor’s Introduction

Abstract

Environmental resources are used for a variety of consumptive and productive purposes, in particular as a life—supporting system and as a receptor of waste products stemming from the processes of production and consumption. In the absence of exclusive property rights and markets, conflicts over competing uses are unavoidable. In the Pigouvian tradition the remedy called for is a tax—subsidy scheme to “internalise” externalities. From this perspective, there does not seem to be any need for cooperation, and conflicts of interest do not seem to matter even though taxes or subsidies generate winners and losers. Many environmental economists maintain, however, that in case on non—exclusive, attenuated or uncertain property rights the utilisation of environmental resources necessarily involves strategic behavior of self—interested agents, bargaining, cooperation or other efforts to generate or settle conflicts. This is not only true for transfrontier or global environmental conflicts but also when pollution has purely domestic sources and impacts. Consequently, any modelling of environmental resource allocation should explicitly capture the conflicts involved. This is not to deny the necessity of policy design and professional consulting of government. On the contrary, to understand the preconditions of successful policy implementation, descriptive analysis of that type is indispensable.