Abstract
The 1967 Goodwin model is a prey-predator type model representing the competition among capitalists and workers for the employment rate and for the workers’ income share. Recently it is been studied in a noncooperative dynamic game setting by Balbucci, Candela and Ricci [1]. They found that it is not possible to eliminate the Cycle but it is possible to locate the Golden Age point in a position where the employment rate value is determined by workers while the profit level by capitalists. Unfortunatelly the game is of infinite duration. Aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility for each player to force both components of the critic point. It is natural to formulate the game as a bargaining game and to look for the Kalai, Smorodinski solution.
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References
R. Balducci, G. Candela, G. Ricci, “A generalization of R.M. Goodwin Model with Rational Behaviour of Economic Agents”, in Goodwin, Krugger, Vercelli “Nonlinear Models of Fluctuating Growth”, Springer Verlag Lect. Notes in Econ. and Math Syst. 228, 1984
T. Basar, “On the uniqueness of Nash solution for linear-quadratic games”, Int. Journal of Game Theory, 1976
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G. Ricci, “Applications of Mathematics to the Goodwin model”, in G. Ricci, K. Velupfflai, “Growth Cycles and Multisectoral Economics: the Goodwin tradition”, Springer Verlag, Lect Notes in Econ. and Math. Syst.309, 1988
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ricci, G. (1991). Bargaining on the Goodwin Model. In: Ricci, G. (eds) Decision Processes in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 353. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53592-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45686-2
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