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Constructions of Signcryption in the Multi-user Setting from Identity-Based Encryption

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Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2013)

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Abstract

The security of signcryption requires both confidentiality and integrity, and various constructions of signcryption have been proposed so far. Although insider security in the multi-user setting is desirable in signcryption, in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles) there are only few generic constructions of signcryption which meet both strong insider indistinguishability and strong insider unforgeability in the multi-user setting. In this paper, we propose two generic constructions of signcryption schemes in the standard model, and our constructions achieve such strong security. Our generic constructions are simple and quite different from the existing constructions of signcryption, and ours are based on the elegant known techniques for constructing strongly secure public-key encryption from identity-based encryption.

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Nakano, R., Shikata, J. (2013). Constructions of Signcryption in the Multi-user Setting from Identity-Based Encryption. In: Stam, M. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. IMACC 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8308. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-45238-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45239-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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