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Corporate Form, Institutional Complementarity, and Organizational Behavior: Open versus Closed Joint-Stock Companies in Russia

  • Ichiro IwasakiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance book series (CSEG)

Abstract

The vast majority of Russian corporations are still compelled to become closed joint-stock companies that lack a modern fundraising mechanism in order to attract capital from a wide range of private investors. This is due to factors such as significant insider ownership, a strong orientation among managers toward closed organizations, slumping needs for corporate finance, and underdeveloped local financial institutions. The impact of ownership structure on the choice of corporate form exists, even if we assume that the two elements are determined endogenously. Under these circumstances, however, a significant number of closed companies attempt to develop more open internal organizational structures that are virtually the same as those of open companies. Nonetheless, an institutional coupling of a closed corporate form and an open internal organizational structure is far from effective in resolving the serious in-house problems facing Russian firms, such as the prevention of infighting among executives and shareholders and the implementation of discipline among top management.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Firm Performance Ownership Structure Business Group Open Company 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This chapter presents research outcome from a Japan-Russia joint research project titled “Corporate Governance and Integration Processes in the Russian Economy” launched by the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, and the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, National Research University – Higher School of Economics. It is a substantially revised and extended version of Iwasaki (2007b, 2009). This research was financially supported by a grant-in-aid for scientific research from the Ministry of Education and Sciences in Japan (No. 23243032), the Joint Usage and Research Center of the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, and the Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation (JSSF). I also thank Naohito Abe, Sabri Boubaker (book coeditor), Tatiana G. Dolgopyatova, Martin Gilman, Satoshi Mizobata, Duc K. Nguyen (book coeditor), and Andrei Yakovlev for their valuable comments and suggestions, and Dawn Brandon and Jim Treadway for their careful editorial assistance. Needless to say, all remaining errors are mine.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Economic ResearchHitotsubashi UniversityTokyoJapan

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