Abstract
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that iterative restricted manipulation yields a positive increase in the Condorcet efficiency and Borda score for a number of standard voting rules.
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Grandi, U., Loreggia, A., Rossi, F., Venable, K.B., Walsh, T. (2013). Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score. In: Perny, P., Pirlot, M., Tsoukiàs, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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