A Logic for Information Flow Analysis of Distributed Programs

  • Musard Balliu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8208)

Abstract

Securing communication in large scale distributed systems is an open problem. When multiple principals exchange sensitive information over a network, security and privacy issues arise immediately. For instance, in an online auction system we may want to ensure that no bidder knows the bids of any other bidder before the auction is closed. Such systems are typically interactive/reactive and communication is mostly asynchronous, lossy or unordered. Language-based security provides language mechanisms for enforcing end-to-end security. However, with few exceptions, previous research has mainly focused on relational or synchronous models, which are generally not suitable for distributed systems.

This paper proposes a general knowledge-based account of possibilistic security from a language perspective and shows how existing trace-based conditions fit in. A syntactic characterization of these conditions, given by an epistemic temporal logic, shows that existing model checking tools can be used to enforce security.

Keywords

possibilistic information flow logic of knowledge language-based security verification 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Musard Balliu
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and CommunicationKTH Royal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

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