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Attacks to the Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes from IWSEC2011

  • Toshiyuki Isshiki
  • Manh Ha Nguyen
  • Keisuke Tanaka
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8231)

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to convert a ciphertext encrypted for Alice (delegator) into a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) by using a re-encryption key generated by Alice. In PRE, non-transferability is a property that colluding proxies and delegatees cannot re-delegate decryption rights to a malicious user. In IWSEC 2011, Hayashi, Matsushita, Yoshida, Fujii, and Okada introduced the unforgeability of re-encryption keys against collusion attack (UFReKey-CA), which is a relaxed notion of the non-transferability. They also proposed a stronger security notion, the strong unforgeability of re-encryption keys against collusion attack (sUFReKey-CA). Since sUFReKey-CA implies UFReKey-CA and sUFReKey-CA is simpler (i.e. easier to treat) definition than UFReKey-CA, sUFReKey-CA is useful to prove UFReKey-CA. They then proposed two concrete constructions of PRE and claimed that they meet both replayable-CCA security and sUFReKey-CA under two new variants of the Diffi-Hellman inversion assumption. In this paper, we present two concrete attacks to their PRE schemes. The first attack is to the sUFReKey-CA property on their two schemes. The second attack is to the assumptions employed in the security proofs for sUFReKey-CA of their two schemes.

Keywords

Proxy re-encryption non-transferability unforgeability of re-encryption keys 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Toshiyuki Isshiki
    • 1
  • Manh Ha Nguyen
    • 2
  • Keisuke Tanaka
    • 2
  1. 1.NEC CorporationJapan
  2. 2.Tokyo Institute of TechnologyJapan

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