Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol

  • Nasour Bagheri
  • Praveen Gauravaram
  • Masoumeh Safkhani
  • Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-41332-2_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8262)
Cite this paper as:
Bagheri N., Gauravaram P., Safkhani M., Sanadhya S.K. (2013) Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol. In: Hutter M., Schmidt JM. (eds) Radio Frequency Identification. RFIDSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8262. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


Recently Gao et al. proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [3] to resist against intermittent position trace attacks and desynchronization attacks and called it RIPTA-DA. They also verified their protocol’s security by data reduction method with the learning parity with noise (LPN) and also formally verified the functionality of the proposed scheme by Colored Petri Nets. In this paper, we investigate RIPTA-DA’s security. We present an efficient secret disclosure attack against the protocol which can be used to mount both de-synchronization and traceability attacks against the protocol. Thus our attacks show that RIPTA-DA protocol is not a RIPTA-DA.


RFID Security Disclosure attack Intermittence position trace attack Desynchronization attack 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nasour Bagheri
    • 1
  • Praveen Gauravaram
    • 2
  • Masoumeh Safkhani
    • 3
  • Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
    • 4
  1. 1.Electrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIran
  2. 2.Innovation Labs HyderabadTata Consultancy Services LimitedHyderabadIndia
  3. 3.Electrical Engineering DepartmentIran University of Science and TechnologyTehranIran
  4. 4.Indraprastha Institute of Information TechnologyDelhiIndia

Personalised recommendations