Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol
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- Bagheri N., Gauravaram P., Safkhani M., Sanadhya S.K. (2013) Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol. In: Hutter M., Schmidt JM. (eds) Radio Frequency Identification. RFIDSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8262. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Recently Gao et al. proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol  to resist against intermittent position trace attacks and desynchronization attacks and called it RIPTA-DA. They also verified their protocol’s security by data reduction method with the learning parity with noise (LPN) and also formally verified the functionality of the proposed scheme by Colored Petri Nets. In this paper, we investigate RIPTA-DA’s security. We present an efficient secret disclosure attack against the protocol which can be used to mount both de-synchronization and traceability attacks against the protocol. Thus our attacks show that RIPTA-DA protocol is not a RIPTA-DA.