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A Two-Tiered Formalization of Social Influence

  • Zoé Christoff
  • Jens Ulrik Hansen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8196)

Abstract

We propose a new dynamic hybrid logic to reason about social networks and their dynamics building on the work of “Logic in the Community” by Seligman, Liu and Girard. Our framework distinguishes between the purely private sphere of agents, namely their mental states, and the public sphere of their observable behavior, i.e., what they seem to believe. We then show how such a distinction allows our framework to model many social phenomena, by presenting the case of pluralistic ignorance as an example and discussing some of its dynamic properties.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zoé Christoff
    • 1
  • Jens Ulrik Hansen
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language and ComputationUniversity of AmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversitySweden

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