Proofs of Storage: Theory, Constructions and Applications

  • Seny Kamara
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8080)


Proofs of storage (PoS) are cryptographic protocols that allow a client to efficiently verify the integrity of remotely stored data. To use a PoS, the client sends an encoded version of its data to the server while keeping a small amount of state locally. At any point in time, the client can then verify the integrity of its data by executing a highly-efficient challenge-response protocol with the server.

Since their introduction in 2007 by Ateniese et al. (Computer and Communications Security, 2007) and Juels and Kaliski (Computer and Communications Security, 2007), PoS have received a lot of attention from the research community. This is due in large part to their potential practical applications (e.g., to the design of various kinds of secure cloud storage systems) but also due to their inherent theoretical properties and their connections to fundamental primitives like digital signatures, identification schemes, zero-knowledge proofs and error-correcting codes.

In this talk, I will survey the current state of PoS research. This will include the many variants of PoS that have been invented over the years, how to design them, the connections that have been established between PoS and other primitives and the many new applications PoS have enabled.


Cloud Computing Communication Security Cloud Storage Cryptographic Protocol Cryptology ePrint Archive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seny Kamara
    • 1
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchUSA

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