Abstract
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi show that the political institutions and parliamentary modus operandi ensure the executive’s capacity to act, in spite of a number of—ultimately only theoretical—inadequacies. In the context of the institutional structure established in 1988, the country showed itself capable of overcoming, at least in part, apparently insurmountable problems as, for instance, currency stabilization, economic growth and redistribution. The negative impact of a fragmented parliament and the personal interests of parliamentarians are not reflected in the functioning of the executive. Instead, the opposite is the case. The executive generally controls the work of the legislative branch and is also very successful with its own legislative initiatives. The analysis shows that the internal variables of the decision making process, i.e., the legislative power of the President and the centralized organization of the legislature, compensate the negative effects. It is clear that the aim of the Constituent Assembly was actually reached: to increase the ability of the government to impose its agenda.
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Notes
- 1.
Mainwaring asserts: “Cardoso was a better leader than his predecessors. He was articulate, had a clear vision of where he wanted to go, and chose capable ministers” (1997:107).
- 2.
The term “governability” (governabilidade) has several uses. We refer to its most common use, i.e., the ability of the executive or the Government to implement its legislative agenda.
- 3.
Special committees are set up to examine issues that are assigned to more than three committees.
- 4.
Note that this does not refer to a presidential urgency request.
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Figueiredo, A.C., Limongi, F. (2016). Political Institutions and Governmental Performance in Brazilian Democracy. In: de la Fontaine, D., Stehnken, T. (eds) The Political System of Brazil. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_5
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