SAFE: A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Multi-radio, Multi-channel Spectrum Allocation

  • Ruihao Zhu
  • Fan Wu
  • Guihai Chen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7992)


The rapid growth of wireless technology has led to increasing demand for spectrum. In the past, spectrum is statically allocated. As a result, many wireless applications cannot use idle spectrum even though it is left unused by the owner for a long period of time. The low utilization of already scarce spectrum resource requires us to dynamically reallocate the idle spectrum to achieve better spectrum usage. In this paper, we model the problem of spectrum reallocation as a sealed-bid reserve auction, and propose SAFE, which is a Strategy-proof Auction mechanism For multi-radio, multi-channel spEctrum allocation. We prove the strategy-proofness of SAFE theoretically, and evaluate its performance extensively. Evaluation results show that SAFE achieve good performance, in terms of spectrum utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio.


Reserve Price Channel Assignment Channel Allocation Spectrum Allocation Online Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruihao Zhu
    • 1
  • Fan Wu
    • 1
  • Guihai Chen
    • 1
  1. 1.Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and SystemsShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityChina

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