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Practical Probability: Applying pGCL to Lattice Scheduling

  • David Cock
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7998)

Abstract

Building on our published mechanisation of the probabilistic program logic pGCL we present a verified lattice scheduler, a standard covert-channel mitigation technique, employing randomisation as an elegant means of ensuring starvation-freeness. We show that this scheduler enforces probabilistic non-leakage, in addition to non-starvation. The refinement framework employed is compatible with that used in the L4.verified project, supporting our argument that full-scale verification of probabilistic security properties for realistic systems software is feasible.

Keywords

Probabilistic Choice Cache Line Covert Channel Private State Practical Probability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Cock
    • 1
  1. 1.NICTA and University of New South WalesAustralia

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